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SUBJECT OF THE PRESENT DISCOURSE; INSTRUMENTS AND AIDS AS
WAYS AND MEANS OF LEARNING; VICO'S AIM AND MINE

Three hundred years ago, rhetoric professor Giambattista Vico delivered an oration celebrating the opening of the school year at the University
of Naples.' In a fifteen-part speech on the "method of knowledges" or approaches to education and studies of his time, Vico compared the learning
of the "Ancients" and the "Modems" and devoted a couple of long sections
to law and legal education. He pleaded, in the face of the newlypredominant Cartesian "method," for a so-called return to eloquence and
for greater attention to the work of memory and imagination in education,
foreshadowing what in his later work would become his "new science" of
humanity: a combination of philology, philosophy, and history.
This essay draws loosely on the form and spirit of Vico's On the Study
Methods of Our Time to comment critically on intellectual and institutional
approaches to U.S. legal studies today. Like Vico's text, this essay began as
a talk and has been revised for publication into fifteen parts of varying
length.2 After an introduction to legal education, Parts III through IX compare rhetoric to the various disciplines that take law as their subject matter.
Parts X through XIV consider the current aids to legal learning. The essay
as a whole explores the limits and possibilities of different approaches to
law. In the context of the contemporary administrative state of university
education, it argues that law and legal education are not only too important
to leave to the lawyers, but also too important to leave to social scientists
and policy makers. It shows what the contributions of rhetoric to contemporary legal studies could be.
Vico's address on the system of studies of his time, which was published with revisions a year after he delivered it, takes "Truth" to be the
sole aim of all intellectual pursuits. Vico identifies the drawbacks and disadvantages of modem approaches to knowledge in light of this aim. He
distinguishes knowledges, such as arts, sciences, and inventions, which
concern the materials of learning, from instruments and aids of learning,
which comprise the ways and means of learning. Vico limits the topic of
his discourse to ways and means of learning, but discusses sciences and arts
insofar as he finds that they constitute new or modem instruments of
knowledge. The common instrument of all modem sciences and arts, Vico
writes, is philosophical "critique" (or "method"). This rational method,
1. GIAMBATTISTA VICO, ON THE STUDY METHODS OF OUR TIME (Elio Gianturco trans., Cornell
Univ. Press 1990) (1709).
2. Vico's original oration did not contain sections. The translator made divisions and derived a
table of contents from Vico's summary of the talk. Id. at xlix ("Note on the Text").
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following Descartes, claims to begin with fundamental-necessary and
universal-truths and to deduce consequences from them. The instrument
of geometry is analysis; of physics, it is geometry; of medicine, chemistry;
of astronomy, the telescope; and so forth. Contemporary complementary
aids for learning include "orderly reduction to systematic rules" of that
"which the Ancients were wont to entrust to practical common sense,"
works of literature and fine arts, types used in printing, and universities as
institutions of learning. 3 Law, "which the Ancients, balked by the difficulty
of the task, gave up hope of organizing into a systematically arranged, methodical body of theory," provides a prime example for Vico of a subject
which the Ancients left to unaided common sense but which the Moderns
'4
have organized into an "arte. "
Far be it from me to take on the ambitious task of addressing all fields
of scholarship that Vico as rhetoric professor presented as both his "duty"
and his "right."'5 My aim instead is more circumscribed: in the course of an
exploration of the ways and means of U.S. legal education, I will show
what rhetorical study can offer to the study of law in early twenty-firstcentury United States academic institutions. I take truth to be the aim of
intellectual pursuits; I do not presume that all contemporary pursuits of the
legal art are intellectual ones. The current system of legal studies has, as
Vico would put it, its own advantages and deficiencies-both as an intellectual pursuit and for the pursuit of law. Greater attention to the rhetoric of
law, a twenty-first-century Vico would agree, would make legal studies
"more correct and finer in every respect."' 6
II. INSTRUMENTS OF LEARNING: INSTITUTIONS OF LEGAL STUDIES
(USA); PROFESSIONAL LAW SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIC DISCIPLINES
As most of you will know, law in the U.S.-in contrast to law in many
other countries-involves a three-year professional training, acquired in
post-baccalaureate or post-graduate schools. Undergraduate students with
degrees in a wide array of fields come to law school to acquire what one
U.S. law professor (with a PhD) irreverently calls a "second BA." (In naming the degree "LLB," Canadians make the status of the law degree explicit.) Although law schools offer some clinical training, the curriculum
consists primarily of three years of coursework, typically interspersed with

3.
4.
5.
6.

Id.at8.
Id.at12, 24.
Id.at79.
Id.at77.
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two summers of legal work, followed by one summer of "bar review
courses" in preparation for a state licensing exam.
Entering law students may not have had exposure to the array of undergraduate courses on law offered in such fields as philosophy, economics, sociology, psychology, political science, anthropology, literature,
business, interdisciplinary legal studies, and even rhetoric. (As a rhetoric
professor, Vico's main job was to prepare students for the study of law.)
There is little doubt though that as undergraduate majors aspiring to law
school, students have pored over the rankings of law schools announced
annually since 1990 in U.S. News & World Report. Even as these rankings
initially were accorded little credence by law school insiders, they have
transformed the ways that law schools are run. 7 Originally intended simply
to convey information describing the law schools to prospective students,
the rankings have affected how law schools operate admissions, appointments, placements, and public relations. As Wendy Espeland and Michael
Sauder put it:
Rankings "normalize" schools by creating a precise, relative system of
classification which changes how law schools make sense of their
schools' identities and their relation to other schools. By transforming
how law schools think about themselves and pressuring these schools to
discipline themselves, rankings have become "embodied" in these institutions as they
have become internalized standards of comparison and
8
achievement.
To raise a school's rank, for instance, a school may decrease its number of
acceptances of incoming students and increase its number of transfer students, thereby raising its average incoming LSAT score while keeping
student body size constant-and irrespective of concern for the school's
"mission." As donors and others look to rankings that administrators privately and sometimes publicly say are overrated, schools nevertheless use
the rankings in their promotional materials. Management and promotion of
the law school becomes an aspect of the business of learning.
Once in law school, students begin with basic courses (contracts, torts,
property, criminal law, civil procedure, legal writing, and occasionally
constitutional law) taught by professors who are encouraged to publish in
law reviews. Unlike other scholarly journals, law reviews are largely student, rather than peer, reviewed and edited. Publications in them (are said
7. Wendy Nelson Espeland & Michael Sauder, Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures
Recreate Social Worlds, 113 AM. J. Soc. 1 (2007); see also Wendy Nelson Espeland & Michael Sauder,
The Disciplineof Rankings: Public Measures, Decoupling,and OrganizationalChange, AM. Soc. REv.
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 2, on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review) [hereinafter The
Disciplineof Rankings].
8. The Disciplineof Rankings, supra note 7 (manuscript at 5-6).
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to) hold little value in academic promotions outside the professional law
school. 9 Law thus constitutes its own field or discipline. Law, Ala Foucault,
has its own rules of exclusion, of internal construction, and of interpretation.10 Elizabeth Mertz shows how in contracts, for instance, students learn
to "think like a lawyer."' "I Based on painstaking observation, transcription,
and coding of the interactions in eight semester-long contracts law classes,
Mertz shows how law students ultimately become strategists of speech.
They learn to present themselves and the parties whom they animate in
response to questions about cases in particular ways. They learn to privilege texts not for their stories of human conflicts but for their answers to "a
series of nested questions about the authority of various courts deciding the
case at issue, and also of the courts that authored precedents." 12 They learn
to treat legal texts as "detachable chunks of discourse" that can be moved
from one context to another. 13 Through textbooks intent on categorizing
and consolidating issues and precedents, vast differences in the cultural
meanings of particular kinds of actions or items become elided into a
common legal language 1 4 which reworks temporality and history. 15 Persons in conflicts become types; students come to know "parties" through
occupational status and worldly belongings, referring to them as (the)
"Buyer" or "Seller," into whose mouths they put strategic language whose
looseness contrasts to the precision demanded when quoting legal authorities. "Policy" becomes a catch-all phrase for matters unaddressed in written
text.1 6 As students ostensibly prepare for legal practice, Mertz argues, they
engage in a landscape of argumentative positions, discourse frames, and
participant roles, coming to inhabit and speak an "I" that is not "their own
self."

17

Professional education is of course not the only route to knowing law.
A plethora of other disciplines take law as their subject matter, even when
they do not explicitly contribute to the training of legal practitioners and
9. For some sense of the reasons why, see Penelope Pether, Negotiating the Structures of Violence; or, On Not Inventing "The Sullivans ", 15 SOC. SEMIOTICS 5, 13-17 (2005).
10.

See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DISCOURSE ON

LANGUAGE 215-37 (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., Barnes & Noble 1993) (1969); see also The Discipline of Rankings, supra note 7 (manuscript at 2-3) (drawing on the "discipline" of Foucault's Discipline and Punish).
11. ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL:
LAWYER" (2007).

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at62.
Id. at45.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 63.
Id.
at 75-79.
Id. at 135.
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the formal legal professoriate. Indeed, approaching law from the perspective of other knowledges has become so popular in recent years that there
has been not only a proliferation of undergraduate legal studies programs
but also the emergence of post-graduate (or "graduate" as they are known
in the U.S.) PhD granting programs in interdisciplinary law and society.] 8
To understand the legal studies methods of our time then, it is necessary to consider not only the modes of legal reasoning taught in the professional law schools, but also the diverse disciplinary approaches to law.
III. PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC; THE IMPERATIVE BELONGING TO LAW:
TELLING SOMEONE WHAT TO DO; IDENTIFYING LAW'S ADDRESSEE,
WHAT LAW COUNTS AS DOING, AND LAW'S MANNER OF TELLING

Philosophy may no longer be the queen of the sciences and philosophy
of law may not have the cach, for contemporary rhetoric professors that it
once held for Vico, who long aspired to, yet failed to achieve, a chair in
jurisprudence. (Vico consoled himself by writing what he considered his
masterpiece, The New Science.) Philosophy manqu~e is still a convenient
way to introduce rhetoric.
Today, as in Vico's time, mainstream teaching presents philosophical
debate about law as an argument between natural lawyers and positivists. 19
The conventional understanding of this debate identifies natural law with a
higher moral (or, formerly, divine) law that claims to be the measure of
what properly counts as law. It presents positivism as claiming that factual,
non-moral criteria, such as procedural regularity or the command of a sovereign, comprise the entire test of a law's existence and validity. Although
there are differences within positivism--early legal positivists defined law
as the command, backed by threats, of a sovereign, while latter-day positivists define law as a man-made system of rules-positivists maintain a conceptual separation between morality, justice, or the law that "ought" to be

18. For a description of undergraduate legal studies programs, see American Bar Association,
Legal Studies Program Directory, http://www.abanet.org/publiced/undergrad/home.html (last visited
Apr. 19, 2008), the ABA's online directory of over sixty undergraduate programs focusing on law and
the liberal arts across the United States and Canada. Graduate programs include the interdisciplinary
Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program at the University of California at Berkeley and the Law and
Society Program at New York University, as well as numerous other programs combining a PhD with a
JD.
19. E.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER & WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
(1996) (Chapter 1 "What is Law?" includes two sections entitled "The Theory of Natural Law" and
"Legal Positivism"); see also JOEL FEINBERG & JULES COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (8th ed. 2008)

(Part I "The Nature of Law" begins with chapters entitled "The Natural Law Tradition" and "Legal
Positivism").
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and the law that exists. 20 They take law to be an empirical matter of human
enactment, broadly understood. Within the conventional understanding of
the philosophical debate, then, the subject matter of the philosophy of law
becomes an argument about the proper reference or meaning of "law."
A common understanding cuts across the philosophical differences
about what law is or should be, however. Philosophical claims about law,
whatever their differences, take for granted that law tells someone what to
do or how to act. However well or poorly law is thought by philosophers
and others to do so, its task, role, function, or aim appears to be the imparting of an imperative: a telling of what "must" be done. (The ambiguity of
"must" as a single auxiliary verb that expresses both necessity by compulsion and necessity by obligation nicely represents the issue that joins natural law and legal positivism.) In any particular instance, a law that is
relevant tells its addressee(s) what to do. In so doing, law does not make
propositional assertions as such; it makes claims, so to speak, as to practical
action. 2 1 Philosophical claims that discuss law or even action, by contrast
to legal claims as to action, tend to assert propositions or statements of
rules and leave open the practical question of what, in any particular instance, to do.
Today, the rhetorician sides with the rare political scientist who considers law to be something other than power politics, and who suggests that
the regulatory practices of administrative and bureaucratic agencies (conceming, for instance, the environment, immigration, business, transportation, health, welfare, and education) are more important than the natural
law/positive law debate for actually understanding how modem law tells us
what to do. Rather than arguing with philosophers about the meaning of
law, the rhetorician ponders the insight that law-not philosophy, despite
some of its past claims to establish the law-tells us what to do. 22 In telling
someone what to do, law-whether positive law, moral law, natural law, or
custom; whether administrative regulation, bureaucratic rule, statute, com20. For early Positivism, see JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED
(John Murray 2d ed. 1861). For latter-day examples, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed.
1994); HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Anders Wedberg trans., Russell &
Russell 1961) (1945); JOSEPH RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1980); and JOSEPH RAZ,

PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (1975). See also works by Brian Bix, Jules Coleman, and Brian
Leiter.
21. The particularity of the legal act of "claiming" is discussed further in Part VI, infra. One might
say of claims what J.L. Austin says of statements: "[T]he statement itself is a 'logical construction' out
of the [active] makings of statements." J.L. AUSTIN, How TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS I n.1 (2d ed.
1975) (1962).
22. The foundation and gist of what follows, through the penultimate paragraph of this section,
summarizes and reworks MARIANNE CONSTABLE, JUST SILENCES: THE LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF
MODERN LAW 18-21 (2005).
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mand, or tradition; whether rightly or wrongly; whether as power or as
justice-addresses subjects and their actions. Thus any view of, or appeal
to, law-whether claim of law or proposition about law-can be examined
rhetorically: for who or what the addressee of law is taken to be (in other
words, its subject), for an understanding of what it is for that subject to do
or to act, and for how law does its telling.
In other words, the expression of a so-called "imperative"-the telling
of "what must be done" that characterizes and is the particular activity of
law-manifests and has manifested itself variously: in custom, tradition,
practice, obligation, command, declaration, rule, statute, sign, calculation,
judgment, socialization, and more. One can begin to identify, in claims
describing law and appealing to it, as well as in the claims of law, the following:
*
An addressee or subject, the one or ones whom law addresses. Natural
lawyers consider law's addressees to be Christians, sinners, or religious or moral persons. Kantians consider them to be reasonable persons belonging to a kingdom of ends who have obligations to do their
duty for its own sake. Utilitarians consider law's addressees to be sentient, rational beings who calculate to maximize their pleasures and
minimize their pains. Positivists consider the addressees of humanlyenacted laws to be citizens, persons, residents, officials, human beings, or would-be spouses. The history of jurisprudence can be inter23
preted as the story of changes in conceptions of the subject of law.
Both the claims of jurisprudence and those of law can be analyzed for
whom they take the legal subject to be.
*
A manner of doing. Law-and those who describe it-may consider
the doing that law calls for to be moral action, to be determined or
motivated behavior, to be unreasoned rule following, to be deliberated, or to be coerced. Depending on one's conception of law, which
may be only implicit, the doing enabled by law may constitute a conscientious act of will by a subject (as in retributive theories of punishment); socially-acceptable behavior or socialization (as in some
deterrence or "socio-pedagogical" theories); an indication of health or
illness; the result of calculation; the triumph of reason over passion, of
force over reason, or of collective over individual; and so forth. To
particular doings correspond particular addressees. The transgression

23. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, How the 'Real World' at Last Became a Myth, in TWILIGHT OF
THE IDOLS/THE ANTI-CHRIST 40 (R.J. Hollingdale trans., Penguin Books 1968); Marianne Constable,
Genealogy and Jurisprudence: Nietzsche, Nihilism, and the Social Scientification of Law, 19 LAW &
Soc. INQUIRY 551 (1994).
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taken as sign of illness will be met with the treatment of a subject
whose "normal" state is thought to be "health." The transgression
viewed as miscalculation will prompt changes in the system of incentives and disincentives to which a calculating subject ostensibly refers.
The transgression viewed as ignorance prompts education. Doings
conceived as moral choices correspond with autonomous actors; those
conceived as regulations correspond with options available to administrators and to those whom they administer.
*
A manner of telling. Law claims what to do through communication of
statements of rules, by command, via example, through revelation,
through moral knowledge or legal reasoning, by consensus, through
persuasion, by threat, through the formulation of options or hypothetical imperatives, and more. Again, to particular sorts of telling correspond particular conceptions of doings and subjects. The
commandments of sovereigns correspond to the obedient behavior of
subjects. The transmission of custom corresponds to the practices of
members of a community. To democratic deliberation belong citizens
whose actions determine their way of life. And to the dissemination of
bureaucratic regulations correspond the administration or management
of segments of a population. In our time, the participation of subjects
in their own governance (e.g., through the input and feedback techniques of surveys and polls) suggests the timeliness of questions about
how best to characterize the seemingly simultaneously democratic and
bureaucratic procedures of our law.
In sum, while philosophy of law posits and interrogates its own assertions about the "what-ness" of law, rhetoric refuses to engage directly in
that debate. Instead, it examines the making of claims-by philosophers
and others-about and in the name of law.
IV.

ECONOMICS AND PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL LAW: THEIR
ABSTRACTIONS AS DISADVANTAGES

Nowhere are explicit claims about law more finely constructed than in
the science of economics, which very much informs law today. Vico
claimed that physics, which was taught on the basis of the geometric
method, gave to physical knowledge a false abstracted sense that it could
be derived from axioms. 24 Likewise, in law's application and reliance on
the economic method, deductions follow insofar as they ground themselves
in economic axioms and models. Yet insofar as law is concerned with the
24. VIco, supra note 1, at 21-25.
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practical matter of telling someone what to do, its ostensible and exhaustive
grounding in principle, however elegant, is inappropriate and inadequate.
An overemphasis on principle fails to take into account the particularity of a given situation. In addition, at yet another practical level, the communication of a deductive claim based on principle presumes that the
audience to whom such a claim is made has the same logical capacities and
attunement to the starting principle as does the speaker. To be successful,
the communication of a principle-no less than any other telling-must
take into account its audience: whether, for instance, it is comprised of
beginning students or experts.
In many professional schools, the combination in civil law subjects of
economic terminology and analysis with the rule-based method of legal
> conclusion), smothers, in Vico's
> analysis -reasoning (issue -- rule -terms, the faculties and capacities of a student to perceive analogies, which
constitute the source of "all ingenious, acute, and brilliant forms of expression. ''2 5 As Mertz shows, legal precedent (admittedly an artifact of the
common law and not of the law that Vico was concerned with) juxtaposes
and conflates differences in times and cases, insisting on particular analogies and not on others. Students of the common law who learn only "correct" analogies taught in law school or who seek out only "black-letter law"
or statements of rules miss the opportunity to develop into creative legal
thinkers and eloquent practitioners.
V.

EMPIRICAL SOCIAL RESEARCH AS CORRECTIVE; STRENGTHS AND
DEFICIENCIES OF LEGAL REALISM AND SOCIOLOGY OF LAW

In response to their perception that law is overly informed by the abstractness of principles, models, and statements of rules at the expense of
attention to actuality, sociolegal scholars turn to social science as a corrective. Mertz, a linguistic anthropologist of law, calls, for instance, for social
research to inform and reshape the catchall "policy" category that legal
26
doctrine, at least as taught in many law school classrooms, sets aside.
27
Taking their cue from the legal realism of the early twentieth century, law

25. Id. at 24.
26. MERTZ, supranote 11, at 75-79.
27. E.g., MORRIS R. COHEN & FELIX S. COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY (1951); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (Anchor Books 1963) (1930);
LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927-1960 (1986); WILFRID E. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN
LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1968); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL

LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (Univ. of Oklahoma Press 1985) (1973).
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and society scholars 28 and new legal realists 29 turn to empirical studies of

law-in-action to counter what they perceive as law professors' and economists' unwarranted emphases on principle and doctrine.
Legal realists and others who turn to the empirical study of law are
correct that formal rules alone do not describe legal behavior. They are
correct that legal reasoning bereft of any correspondence with actuality is
vacuous. But in distinguishing law-on-the-books from law-in-action and
rejecting legal texts as simply law-on-the-books, realists move too quickly
away from the ways in which legal speech still matters, insofar as legal
speech involves claims about what to do.
Likewise, sociology or social science serves as a helpful antidote to a
formal rule-like propositional law that models itself on logical truths and
economic models. As Vico might say, however, the antidote also has its
own deficiency or failure of imagination. As an empirical knowledge, the
science of society has a limited sense of reality, which is grounded exclusively in observation. 30 Even scholars interested in what they would call
the "normative" aspect of law situate law in an empirical social world.
Religious law, customary law, the law of First Nations, and the law of indigenous peoples, for instance, are taken by social researchers to be fundamentally products or constructs of society. That "society" is real, that
"reality" is social and empirical, holds such sway that one wonders what
else law could possibly be.
When, in their times, Vico and Montesquieu insisted on the relevance
and reality of social factors for understanding law, they were challenging
the then-dominant "reality" of law as divine or natural. Today the dominant
reality has become that of empirical social study. The powerful hold of
empirical reality is evidenced by the new "empirical legal studies," an effort in recent years by economists and rational choice theorists to operationalize their terms and those of legal doctrine in quantitative empirical
studies. 3 1 While legal realists, latter-day law and society scholars, and now
the "new legal realists" largely criticize the way that legal terms are taken
28. The law and society "movement" began in the mid-1960s. It has organized itself into the U.S.based Law and Society Association, which publishes the Law and Society Review. There are now
numerous non-U.S. professional societies and many journals. "Law and society" has now become a
descriptor of many undergraduate liberal arts programs of law. See, for instance, the ABA website on
undergrad programs, supra note 18.
29. E.g., Symposium, New Legal Realism Symposium: Is it Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005
Wis. L. REV. 335.
30. CONSTABLE, supra note 22, at 9, for the remainder of this paragraph.
31. For information on the organization, publications, conferences and views of the new empirical
legal studies, consult the Society for Empirical Legal Studies, http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/
society.asp?ref=1740-1453&site=I (last visited Apr. 21, 2008), and the Empirical Legal Studies Blog,
http://www.elsblog.org (last visited Apr. 21, 2008).
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for granted, seeking through empirical research to disabuse one of the notion that doctrine captures social reality, the new empirical legal studies
accepts the use of legal-doctrinal and economic terms and categories to
research facts as truth about society. Thus, even as these new economists of
law and more traditional sociologists of law dispute the relevance and significance of legal formulations and economic principles, they both turn to
empirical data to grasp the indisputably social reality that they perceive law
to be.
VI. LEGAL SPEECH ACTS; CLAIMING AS MODERNITY'S SPEECH ACT
PAR EXCELLENCE

Legal realists and sociologists of law are handicapped by the fact that,
in distinguishing law-in-action from law-on-the-books and directing attention away from law as a set of propositional rules or economicallygenerated formulas toward the behaviors and effects of actors and structures in society, they neglect legal texts and presume a peculiar empirical
reality. Rhetoric addresses these drawbacks by attending to the telling of
law. Activities of telling, however conventional, are best understood neither as a set of propositional rules, nor as simply the behaviors of legal
actors, but as speech acts making claims. Rhetoric draws attention, following J.L. Austin, to "claims of law" not as nouns, but as the "verbing"--or
activity or making of claims--out of which a "claim" (as noun) is constructed. Far from being empty verbiage, the telling of law--considered as
speech act-reveals aspects of law-in-action.
The language of "speech acts" comes from Austin, a philosopher of
language whose twelve lectures on the topic were published as How To Do
Things with Words fifty years ago. 32 Sentences or "statements" are not only
propositions, Austin argued, but the making of statements out of which
true-false propositions are constructed. 33 So too, legal claims are not simply propositional, but involve particular sorts of speaking, which are themselves acts or actions. Law, as we shall see, is full of speech acts: parties
complain and defend; lawyers object and rebut; trial judges overrule and
sustain objections; juries find defendants guilty (or not); parties appeal and
respond; appellate courts affirm and vacate lower court orders; legislatures
enact statutes; statutes declare law; officials approve, nominate, suspend,
and grant; and so forth.

32. AUSTIN, supra note 21.

33. Id. at I n.1.
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Austin emphasized the act-like character of speech by identifying
ways in which sentences or utterances were not simply true or false, but
could go wrong. They could go wrong or be "unhappy" in the same way as
other kinds of acts, by being coerced, for instance. 34 But speech acts could
also go wrong their own way, not only by being misunderstood, but by
being "infelicitous" or failing to fulfill the conventions required for the
speech act to take. 35 In requiring that specific procedures be followed for
legal speech acts to be valid, law formalizes and focuses attention on the
"infelicities" to which its speech acts are susceptible.
Austin introduces infelicities by discussing the apparent distinction
between two types of sentences: those which purport to describe or report a
state of affairs and which, as propositions, can be evaluated as true or false;
and those which, in being said, do something such that truth or falsity does
not seem the main issue for understanding the sentence. Austin calls the
former "constative"; he dubs the latter "performative." Explicit performative utterances include: "I pronounce you man and wife," "I promise I will
be on time," and "I hereby order the courtroom cleared." Performative
utterances may be void, hollow, or insincere, rather than simply false. Austin then identifies the sorts of infelicities to which performative utterances
seem particularly susceptible. The act that the performative purports to do
may be void, for example: no conventions may exist for carrying it out; the
conventions may have been misapplied; the procedure may have been carried out incorrectly or incompletely; or it may be that the requisite conventions for the act, though carried out, have been "abused" in some way. 36
The parties may not have had the requisite feelings, thoughts, attitudes, or
subsequent conduct required, for instance, for the act to be felicitous. 3 7
Such would be the case when a promisor has no intention of keeping what
is nevertheless a promise. 38
Over the course of Austin's lectures, the distinction between constative and performative utterances breaks down. Even constative utterances
do something in being said: they state, they assert, they report a state of
affairs, or they describe something. And performative utterances turn out to
be susceptible not only to what Austin calls "infelicities," but also to being
incorrect-false-about a state of affairs. "I warn you that the bull is about
to charge" may be false if the speaker is mistaken about what the bull is

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 14.
Id. at 1-7.
Id. at 12-38.
Id. at 39-52.
Id. at 9-1I.
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about to do. Ultimately then, Austin redescribes both constative and performative utterances as speech acts.
Speech acts occur as events. Like non-speech acts, speech acts can be
described in various ways. (The same non-speech act can be described as
"walking to the side of the room, turning a handle, and pushing," "opening
the door of the classroom," or "letting in some fresh air," for instance.)
Speech acts can be described as doing things or using language in three
more or less distinct ways: they may be considered locutionary, illocutionary, or perlocutionary. They may be "locutionary acts," that is, acts of making sounds (phonetic), in a vocabulary and grammar (phatic), which has
meaning (rhetic). One is focusing on the locutionary aspect of a speech act
when one considers the truth value of a "statement." Speech acts may be
"illocutionary acts" in which the saying of words constitutes the doing of
the act (e.g., promising, betting, or apologizing). They may also be "perlocutionary acts," in which case their descriptions often invoke the effects
produced by the saying. Take an example: a man says to his parents, "I am
engaged." Locutionarily, he said to his parents that he was engaged, (presuming ordinary circumstances) meaning that he had committed himself to
marry. Illocutionarily, (again) presuming ordinary circumstances, he announced his engagement to his parents. (The illocutionary "force" of an act
does not always require an explicit performance utterance; one need not say
"I announce such-and-such" to announce such-and-such.) Perlocutionarily,
he may have produced any number of effects: he may simply have made
his parents aware of his future plans-or he may have alarmed them or
made them very happy.
Illocutionary acts happen in something's being (locutionarily) said;
they follow the conventions required for something to be a successful--or,
again, in Austin's terms, felicitous-announcement (or promise or warning). A perlocutionary act is not itself conventional (although it may be
brought off by a conventional act). Perlocutionary acts happen contingently, rather than by convention. They are the products or effects of illocutionary acts; they occur by (rather than in) something's being said.39 As
Austin puts it in one of his many suggestive references to law, "A judge
should be able to decide, by hearing what was said, what locutionary and

39. Illocutionary acts are not different acts than perlocutionary acts. They are different aspects of a
speech act. Sometimes the success of an illocutionary act will depend on the achievement of a certain
effect, but "[tihis is not to say that the illocutionary act is the achieving of a certain effect." Id. at 116
(emphasis added). A warning cannot be said to be successful unless its audience has heard the warning
and taken it a certain way. But this does not make the illocutionary act of warning into the procuring of
effects. The act of warning may achieve a perlocutionary object of alerting and a perlocutionary sequel
of alarming. See id. at 116-18.
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illocutionary acts were performed, but not what perlocutionary acts were
40
achieved."
When a statement or utterance is evaluated in terms of its truth or falsity, one is focusing on the locutionary aspect of a speech act of, for instance, stating. One abstracts-to some degree-from the illocutionary
aspect of the speech act to ascertain its correspondence with the facts. (One
abstracts only to some degree because correspondence with the facts indeed
also relies in part on what kind of statement the speaker is taken to be engaging in. Austin offers as example the utterance, "France is a hexagon."'4 1
This may be true on an elementary school test, although false to a geographer.) When an utterance is assessed not so much for its truth or falsity but
for its happiness or felicity as, for instance, an apology, a promise, a declaration, or an order, one is considering it as an illocutionary act, the status of
which will depend on particular conventions having been met.4 2 If the conventions for the performance of the illocutionary act have not been met, the
act is infelicitous the same way that performative utterances were said to
43
have been infelicitous.
Despite familiarity in legal practice with the issue of the felicitousness
of speech acts, in the form of attention to proper procedure, legal scholarship tends to succumb to Austin's criticism of philosophers that they have
neglected the study of illocutionary acts. Austin writes that "for too long
philosophers have ...treat[ed] all problems as problems of 'locutionary
usage.' ' 4 4 Sociolegal scholars, conversely, have treated all problems of
legal speech as problems of perlocutionary force or effect. Neither philosophers nor sociolegal scholars have paid enough attention to the illocutionary acts of law. Not enough attention has been paid to what happens in
(rather than by) the act (rather than "content") of speaking in law.
Legal analysts tend to embroil themselves, on the one hand, in discussions of the correctness of rules and the soundness of arguments and, on the
other hand, in discussions of the consequences of particular legal acts. Thus
discussion of the landmark Miranda opinion at the time of its issuance, for
instance, revolved around the correctness of its legal principles and reasoning and the effect it would have on police practices and prosecutorial outcomes. The debate continues today, with few commentators considering
seriously what is at stake in the "warning" and in the "holding" that inter-

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

122.
143.
145-46.
12-38.
100.
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rogators must warn an accused of the right to remain silent before prosecutors will be allowed to introduce confessions and other statements as evidence in court.
Orienting oneself toward law as a chain of speech acts allows one to
interpret the Miranda warning, and hence the holding, differently. In
brief,45 Miranda'ssafeguarding of an opportunity for silence in response to
the possibility of coerced speech need not be grounded simply in current
justifications of fairness to the defendant and the need for reliable evidence.
When law is a matter of speech, the justice of law refers at least in part to
the conditions of speech. The Miranda warning and the Miranda holding
acknowledge the dependence of the law on speech acts and acknowledge
limits to the justice of the actual system. The intelligibility of statements
introduced as evidence at trial requires that they meet minimal conditions
for the proper hearing and understanding of utterances; they must take
place under proper speech conditions. A felicitous Miranda warning and
waiver and so forth seek to ensure the continuity of these conditions during
interrogation, so that the statements of an accused who does speak have
value as speech and thus as evidence.
A Miranda warning thus does something different than allow decision-makers to figure out after the fact whether a defendant's statements
were freely or voluntarily given. It does something in addition to serving
the interests of defendants or constraining the behavior of state officials. A
felicitous or successful warning (illocutionarily) cautions an addressee as to
a danger, such that normally she will (perlocutionarily) avoid the danger or
proceed more carefully than she otherwise would. The danger to an accused is the danger named in the warning: utterances made in the extraordinary conditions of the in-custody interrogatory phase of the legal process
carry different import than when those utterances are made in more ordinary conditions. A felicitous Miranda warning thus acknowledges the possibility that the conditions in which the accused is asked to speak may not
be those in which the accused's truths can be properly heard. (We are here
considering the felicity of the warning that is required for an accused's
speech acts to count as speech acts, not whether an accused's speech acts
are themselves felicitous.) Should a felicitous warning be given (admittedly
a question if one accepts current sociolegal and empirical research into
police practices), the silence of an accused may constitute an appropriate
response. Such silence may indeed be prudent and in the accused's interest,
as commentators are quick to remind us. But it may also constitute an ac-

45. This paragraph summarizes CONSTABLE, supra note 22, eh. 7.
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ceptance, by the accused, of the acknowledgment that the procedures that
follow may not do justice to her speech. In this instance, the silence of the
accused does not assure justice. It does disable one particular possibility of
injustice, however (while opening up the possibility of other injustices-in,
for instance, the manner of giving of the warning).
Focusing on the illocutionary aspects of speech acts thus draws attention to aspects of law other than its reasoning and its effects, namely, to
what law does in speaking. Legal speech-whether that of judges, lawyers,
lawmakers, civil servants, or citizens-consists of chains of illocutionary
acts. A contract, for example, must be formed by an offer and an acceptance. The chain of speech acts-invitation to offer, offer, counter-offer,
counter-counter-offer, and acceptance-forms the contract. Likewise, a
party objects, the court sustains the objection, and the opposing party takes
an exception. A trial court convicts, the defendant appeals, the appellate
court finds that the trial judge erred in accepting particular evidence or
instructing the jury a particular way, and the appellate court remands the
case. Law formalizes the conventions for these and other legal speech acts
in part by establishing the procedures without which a given action cannot
be said to have properly occurred.
The language of speech acts also introduces a vocabulary for understanding and clarifying disputes about law. Take for example the "greencard marriage." The language of speech acts and of the infelicities of performative utterances reorients the issues surrounding green-card marriages
away from both rule-like definitions of marriage and the implications and
consequences of particular policies. It allows one to ask whether carrying
out the marriage ritual in a particular instance leads to a professed but hollow marriage (insofar as the parties did not have the thoughts, feelings, or
intentions of the sorts that characterize parties for whom marriage procedures are designed) or not a marriage at all. Likewise, the language of
speech acts and their infelicities allows one to move away from sterile disputes about statements of rules about marriage and the values of particular
outcomes. One can come to distinguish between the implications of understanding there to be no convention for gay marriage and of understanding
there to be a convention for marriage that is misapplied when used by gay
couples.
Finally, analyzing law in terms of speech acts lets one think about relations between law and justice differently. The discussion of the Miranda
warnings above suggests that one understand the Supreme Court's holding
not simply as a correct or incorrect argument about the Fifth Amendment
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or as a strategy for producing constraints on police and prosecutors, but as
concerned with the requirements of a just hearing.
In these examples and others, legal speech acts consist of claims-or
rather acts of making claims about or claiming-as to what an addressee is
to do. Some legal speech acts make the act of claiming explicit. A plaintiff's complaint is an appeal to law: it is a claim that her injury is one that
the law addresses. Likewise, a demurrer is an appeal to law: the defendant
claims that law will not recognize the claims of the plaintiff as formulated
and presented. At stake in both of these claims is the issue that both joins
and divides the parties: the matter of what to do in this case. The parties'
claims are not fundamentally noun-like assertions or propositions or statements of rules but acts of claiming, even if in so doing they assert, propose,
or state.
Even legal speech acts that do not explicitly claim, such as questioning in interrogation or in cross-examination, take place in a context for
considering claims that belong to law, insofar as they concern what someone is told to do. These speech acts may be understood as implicitly framed
by "in the name of the law, answer me this" (or "I warn you, in the name of
the law, that. . . ."). "In the name of the law" introduces a claim about what
someone, in some legal sense, must do. The ambiguity of law's claims
about what "must" be-the necessity of force or the necessity of obligation-suggests that the speech acts of law cannot be limited to commanding. Law consists neither of sets of statements of rules nor of the
commands of a sovereign. Claiming, rather than commanding or stating,
constitutes modernity's legal speech actpar excellence.
VII. POLITICS, AS REALM OF APPEARANCE OF SPEECH AND ACTION, AND
ITS DISREGARD IN MODERN LEGAL STUDY METHODS

The greatest drawbacks to properly learning law are the ways in which
many fail to see that speech and action are matters of ethics and politics.
Legal documents most often consider legal speech and action as politically
neutral. Political theorists, with the exception of constitutional law buffs
and occasional others, largely ignore law. 46 Political scientists study law as
a politically powerful and strategic instrument. Seldom is law taught as a
matter of ethics and justice, much less considered-as in Hannah Arendt's

46. As example of political theorist turning to law, see JENNIFER L. CULBERT, DEAD CERTAINTY:
THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE PROBLEM OF JUDGMENT (2008).
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words-the walls of the polis which give shape to the realm in which prop47
erly political speech and action appear.
Even texts by sociolegal researchers in which justice appears reveal an
uneasy grasp of relations between legal research, speech, action, and politics. Almost thirty years ago, law and society scholars Austin Sarat and
Susan Silbey warned of the "pull of the policy audience" for domestic law
and society research. 48 Today those warnings need reissuing. Sociolegal
scholars need to be alerted to the politics of their work, itself a form of
speech and action. Even former Law and Society Association president,
anthropologist Sally Engle Merry, for instance, seems to take for granted
that the dissemination of her observations in Human Rights and Gender
Violence: TranslatingInternationalLaw into Local Justice49 is, if not objective, politically neutral or progressive.
Merry argues that two conceptions of culture, both of which posit culture as static and unchanging (one as national, the other as traditional), get
in the way of the effective use of human rights and international law to
secure women's rights. These conceptions, she argues, prevent wellintentioned international actors from understanding local struggles and
differences. Merry argues that culture should instead be considered anthropologically, as "a consensual, interconnected system of beliefs and values," 50 as a fluid "repertoire[] of ideas and practices that are not
homogeneous but continually changing because of contradictions among
them or because new ideas and institutions are adopted by members,"'51
possibly as a "repertoire of argument that allowed powerful people to control weaker ones."' 52 Thinking of culture this way allows one to see, Merry
writes, how the transnational culture around human rights is itself a culture
in our global postcolonial world. And should one be interested in promoting human rights, thinking of culture in this way would allow one to act in
more sophisticated ways in relation to local cultures and practices than
some of the transnational culture's state, international, and nongovernmental actors whom Merry encountered currently do.
Merry's book takes its readers to be the very transnational elites that
are in large part its subject matter and whose authority it often accepts: the
non-governmental organization (NGO) actors and activists who use inter47. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 63 n.63 (1958).
48. AUSTIN SARAT & SUSAN SILBEY, The Pull of the Policy Audience, 10 LAW & POL'Y 97

(1988).
49. SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE (2006).

50. Id. at 6.
51. Id. at 11.
52. Id. at 17.
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national law to struggle for women's rights and whose cause would benefit
from more effective-read, anthropologically-informed-use of human
rights discourse. Transnational elites are not only the audience for the book,
though. They are also its heroes, or rather, heroines, admirably shifting
between domains as they aim both to hold states responsible for international violations of gender equality within their territories and to improve
local conditions for women. Merry very much seems to identify with the
perspectives of this elite, who indeed and understandably-with the local
activists she met-constitute the bulk of her informants. As critics of states
rather than formal state officials and as critical spectators rather than mere
observers of the "global stage," NGO activists are more subtle about their
roles than are state representatives, Merry writes. As Western-educated
individuals, they are more articulate within the terms of the Englishspeaking United Nations than are the indigenous subjects about whom they
are concerned. And as non-U.S. and non-European natives, they have better
access to "t least some aspects of the politics and practices of the societies
from which they come than would native Westerners. Herself a Westerneducated, English-speaking spectator of cultures, Merry has access to these
subjects by virtue of the status bestowed on her as an affiliate of a Wellesley College research center that is an NGO institution. And yet, in her
book, Merry appears oblivious not only to the politics of her scholarship
(and the implications of its publication and distribution by a prestigious
U.S. university press) but also to the political implications of granting her
imprimatur to a particular global vision.
Following a sophisticated but all-too-brief consideration of whether
human rights could constitute a new imperialism, Merry concludes:
Despite drawbacks in the way the concept of human rights has been developed and used, it is still the only global vision of socialjustice cur-

rently available. With all its flaws, it is the best we have. It provides at
least some constraint on the operation of markets and offers a potentially
powerful tool to those who learn to use it. Like the language of law itself,
it serves those in power but is always in danger
of escaping its bounds
53
and working in a genuinely emancipatory way.
Merry's timely work thus provokes-perhaps unintentionally-the issue of
how well served "we" are by even "the best" of "global visions of social
justice." Shouldn't sociolegal scholarship be wary of global visions of
whatever sort? And shouldn't sociolegal scholarship be self-conscious
about how texts such as this one, with their claims to expertise of and about
law, participate in a circulation of knowledge that helps legitimize the particular political arrangements, institutions, and practices that would consti53. Id. at 231 (emphasis added).
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tute and perpetuate an ostensibly global system? Such questions remind us
that law and legal studies, like other kinds of speech and action, are matters
of politics.
VIII.POETRY AND MUSIC. UNDER SOME CONDITIONS, THE BUREAUCRACY
AND JARGON OF MODERN LAW CAN LEND ITSELF POETIC APPEARANCE

Like Vico, who writes that "poetical genius is a gift from heaven, and
there exists no instrument by which it can be attained," I have so far "said
nothing about poetry" or music. Although poetry may seem extraneous to
the symmetry of my discourse, "a few words about poetry will not be amiss
at this point." 54 Poetry appears not to belong in institutions of law. It seems
that absorbing the sterile abstractions of law and observing the empirical
realities of society harm poets. These practices benumb the imagination and
stupefy the memory, two faculties on which poetry depends. Further, the
passions and insights of the poet are seldom the concerns of the modern
administrator or sociolegal researcher. The poet neither constructs realities
nor dispels illusions, but sings of what appears. Hence Desmond Manderson sounds out the harmonies and tones of forms of law to play variations
on the theme that justice is always poetic. 55 Peter Goodrich distills the
cases and rules of romantic love in troubadour poetry into what is, in effect,
56
a contracts casebook that reveals the broken promises of modem law.
And even the mundane expressions and experiences of modern governance
allow Franz Kafka, Milan Kundera, T.S. Eliot, and Wallace Stevens, for
57
instance, to depict today's law precisely as fantastic daytime nightmare.
In sum, readers and writers attuned to the sounds of song and speech
comprehend that contemporary regulations favor the utilization of Latinate
terminology. Such phrasing deadens the soul as well as the ears. The multiple linguistic traditions 58 and complicated institutional procedures contributing to the formulation and articulation of contemporary social policies
nevertheless may be acknowledged to provide opportunities for aspiring
poets to excavate the subversive expressive legacies of legality. Or: law
still lets poets dig up another way with words.
54. Vico, supra note 1, at 41-42.
55. DESMOND MANDERSON, SONGS WITHOUT MUSIC: AESTHETIC DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND
JUSTICE (2000).

56. PETER GOODRICH, THE LAWS OF LOVE (2006).
57. E.g., FRANZ KAFKA, THE CASTLE (Edwin Muir & Willa Muir trans., Alfred A. Knopf 2d ed.
1941) (1926); MILAN KUNDERA, THE JOKE (Milan Kundera trans., HarperPerennial 1993) (1967).
Closer to home, see LAWRENCE JOSEPH, LAWYERLAND: WHAT LAWYERS TALK ABOUT WHEN THEY
TALK ABOUT LAW (1997).
58. DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW (1963).
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IX. HISTORY AS LEGAL METHOD: LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES

Perhaps you have been wondering why, in speaking of the instruments
or disciplines by which legal knowledge is procured, I have not mentioned
history, which was so important to Vico.
On the one hand, history shares with contemporary law a faith in the
primacy and authoritativeness of the written text. Positivist legal histories
incessantly reiterate moments of founding and conquest as origins and
59
causes of law.
On the other hand, as a discipline on the cusp of the humanities and
the social sciences, history faces challenges to its methods from all sides.
Confronting discussions of documents as both text and artifact, 60 questions
about the tried and trite distinction between primary and secondary sources,
and considerations about the silences of voices and texts, history now has
the chance to understand both itself and the law differently. History and
law emerge as creative, expressive-rhetorical-practices that make use of
particular conventions for selecting their evidence and constructing their
narratives and arguments. In so doing, they open themselves to the possibility of recognizing as law something that is currently unrecognized as law,
something that is other than positive law. Acknowledging that law once
was something different than what it is now opens the legal historian and
others not only to newly-discovered pasts (to which one can of course not
return), but also to a possibility that law may yet be otherwise than the
61
positivist, social regulation that it is presently taken to be.
X.

TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY AIDS TO LEGAL LEARNING; COMPUTING

Hitherto I have discussed the disciplines as instruments for knowing
law. Let us, like Vico, examine the aids to learning that complement these
instruments. For Vico, learning aids include the reduction to systematic
rules, especially in law (Parts X-XI, infra), masterpieces of art (Part XII),
typographical characters (Part XIII), and universities (Part XIV). Today's
learning aids superficially resemble those of Vico's time, but they are not
the same. Computers and systems-thinking (Parts X and XII, infra), digital
images (Part XI), campus services (Part XIII), and the college or university

59. MARIANNE CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER 67-95 (1994).
60. DOCUMENTS: ARTIFACTS OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE (Annelise Riles ed., 2006).
61. See CONSTABLE, supra note 59, at 89; PETER GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF LAW (1990); PETER
GOODRICH, LAW IN THE COURTS OF LovE (1996); JAMES BOYD WHITE, LIVING SPEECH: RESISTING
THE EMPIRE OF FORCE

(2006)
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professor (Part XIV) aid the enterprise of legal education and contribute to
learning about and knowing law.
According to Vico, "The systematization in preceptive form of many
subjects that depend on common sense ...harm[s] rather than benefit[s] ... our study methods."' 62 Computing today takes systematization to
an extreme. Students now access legal materials, standardized outlines, and
case briefs from across the country through the Internet. Just as some children today believe that vegetables simply come from a store, undergraduates seem to believe that law is found on the web. Legal research is
transformed, as even law firms subscribe to briefing services which allow
practitioners and their assistants to "cut and paste" canned arguments without scissors or glue.
The speed and convenience of the learning aid of computing has also
changed institutions of learning more broadly. Students apply, are admitted
or denied, and pay fees and register, online. From workstations and laptops,
they enroll for classes and read, prepare, and submit assignments posted on
course websites. Laptops allow students to take simultaneous notes or even
to make in-class recordings. They interact with their professors not in office hours, but over email. Variations in their educational experiences
across institutions seem to erode, and not only because computing enables
long-distance learning. Institutions of higher education establish the same
infrastructures and information technologies. Former research libraries
constitute networks of information retrieval systems in which all (who are
licensed) partake. Universities vie to participate in the newly-configured
information marketplace: producing and piloting preprint servers, submissions-management programs for journals, and interactive websites. Schools
come to share common measures of achievement and evaluation (as witnessed by the U.S. News & World Report rankings). They employ standard
language of, for instance, "capstone experiences" to express the type of
learning encouraged across fields.
XI. IMAGES AND VISUAL LITERACY

Unquestionably, the invention of the silicon chip is of signal assistance to legal studies education. Computing has enabled us to obviate the
disadvantages from which, in retrospect, even Vico's Moderns suffered,
such as the enormous cost of books and the necessity to travel long distances to procure them and to acquire a good education. The Moderns were
often denied access to books or education by virtue of practices of owner62. VICO, supra note 1, at 46.
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ship and personal status. Practices of censorship and discrimination affected even public lending libraries until well into the twentieth century.
Today, by contrast, cheap paperbacks are abundant and online access
makes file-sharing simple and cheap. One might fear, however, what Vico
feared of printing and books: "[T]he abundance and cheapness" of virtual
access could "cause us to become less industrious. '63 Vico might compare
us then to "banqueters, who, being surfeited with gorgeous and sumptuous
dinners, wave away ordinary and nourishing food and prefer to stuff them'64
selves with elaborately prepared but less healthy repasts."
All the more reason, then, that visual literacy and familiarity with new
media should be taught in the law schools and required of any accomplished legal practitioner. Not only at trial, but also in the informationgathering and reporting of legal and governmental commissions and elsewhere, visual and audio materials increasingly come into play. 65 The student trained to read and produce images will be able to present and
interpret evidence more clearly. She will also gain through her own encounters with technology a more personal understanding of how such innovations produce stress on the taken-for-granted rubrics of intellectual
66
property and copyright law.

XII. SYSTEMS-THINKING IN THE KNOWING OF LAW

The systematization of legal education via the computer is emblematic
of changes occurring throughout twenty-first-century law and society. Electronic communications replace paper not only in legal education, but also
in law. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that an
electronically-filed notice of appeal, in a jurisdiction where the district
court's local rule requires filing a notice of appeal "conventionally on paper" and defendant's paper notice had not been filed until two months after
the deadline, properly conferred jurisdiction on the Seventh Circuit. 67 The

63. Id. at 72.
64. Id.
65. Richard K. Sherwin, Neal Feigenson & Christina Spiesel, Law in the DigitalAge: How Visual
Communication Technologies Are Transforming the Practice,Theory, and Teaching of Law, 12 B.U. J.
So. & TECH. L. 227 (2006); Alison Young, Images in the Aftermath of Trauma: Responding to September 11th, 3 CRIME, MEDIA, CULTURE 30 (2007).

66. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS (1996); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND
OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 (2006); see also Jessica
Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property,15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 319 (2008).
67. United States v. Harvey, 516 F.3d 553, 555-56 (7th Cir. 2008); see also David Ziemer, Court:
E-mailed Notice of Appeal is OK, WISC. L.J., Feb. 18, 2008, at 9A, available at http://www.wislaw
journal.com/print.cfm?reclD=69641.
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public gets its news increasingly online, rather than through television or
print.
The import of computing is not limited to changes in media, however.
Its significance is as great in terms of the expansion of what one could call
"systems-thinking." Political scientists have long identified their interest in
law as a concern with "the legal system" (and the "legal process"). Contemporary positivist philosophers consider law to be "a system of rules,"
while sociologists study law as, for instance, "a system of social control."
(Indeed, even "non-positivist" philosophers such as Ronald Dworkin, who
would deny the systematicity of legal rules as such, consider law to be that
of a state system which maintains, as for sociologist Max Weber, a legitimate monopoly over violence.) Analyses of law as a system tend to focus
on issues of the law's coherence and the interrelatedness of its elements. In
the analysis of a system, parts or elements are not governed by any central
command in the entity. Rather they react to what Gregory Bateson described as "news of a difference" that is relevant to the responding element
and which an observer conceives of as "information. '6 8 (Information triggers a response in an element, which behaves somewhat in the manner of
students today who expect not questions but "prompts" for their assignments.) A system, then, is defined not merely by its parts, but by the relations that constitute it as a network of activity.
In the context of systems-thinking, new ways of knowing law emerge.
Knowing law is no longer limited to what legal scholars and practitioners
know and what students must learn. Knowing the law becomes something
that, some think, even software can do. 69 Thus a U.S. District Court in
Texas in 1999 enjoined a software manufacturer from selling legal software
in Texas under a statute regulating the "unauthorized practice of law"
(UPL). The Texas Unauthorized Practice of Law Commission (UPLC) had
alleged that a program, Quicken Family Lawyer (QFL), "acts as a 'high
tech lawyer by interacting with its "client" while preparing legal instruments, giving legal advice, and suggesting legal instruments that should be
employed by the user.' In other words, QFL is a 'cyber-lawyer.' '' 70 The
court agreed with the UPLC that since the program asked questions on the
basis of which it selected forms, filled in blanks, and deleted clauses, the
software was performing legal tasks. In addition, the court noted, the soft68. GREGORY BATESON, Form, Substance and Difference, in STEPS TO AN ECOLOGY OF MIND
454,460-61(1972).
69. The analysis that follows is abbreviated from Marianne Constable, The Shuffle of Things: Law
and Knowledge in "Modern Society ", 8 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 73, 79-80 (2007).
70. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., No. 3:97-CV-2859-H, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 813, at *13-14 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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ware package contained few disclaimers and encouraged users' reliance on
the program as a substitute for a lawyer's advice.
A year after the decision, the Texas legislature amended its statutory
description of the practice of law. To its original definition of "practice," 7 1
it simply added disclaimer requirements. 72 If the manufacturer made clear
that its software was not a substitute for consulting a lawyer, then the
73
manufacture, sale, and distribution of QFL would no longer be enjoined.
This odd Texas case, admittedly an outlier in UPL jurisprudence, nevertheless raises nice questions about what it is to know the law today. It
highlights the difference between current legal self-help products and those
of 125 years ago, which proudly announced that one could rely on them
implicitly and with no need for a lawyer. 74 The legal self-help movement's
faith in laypersons' abilities to judge when to consult professionals collides
with UPL regulators' apprehension-in Texas as elsewhere-regarding a
layperson's ability to rely on, or to accurately evaluate the reliability of,
legal products. Indeed, concern for reliability spawned many recommendations in law review articles and bar association reports for evaluating legal
software in Texas. Recommendations included creating mandatory model
disclosure language, requiring low cost or free attorney review of documents, unbundling attorney services, having state bars compile and publish
customer complaints on websites, partnering the state bar with software
manufacturers to produce materials, and gathering product information and
ratings to be published in magazines or on specialized online sites. 75 These
recommendations all feed into an ever-expanding cycle or system of information creation and supply that generates itself in the name of quality con71. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 81.101(a) (Vernon 2005) stated:
In this chapter the "practice of law" means the preparation of a pleading or other document
incident to an action or special proceeding or the management of the action or proceeding on
behalf of a client before a judge in court as well as a service rendered out of court, including
the giving of advice or the rendering of any service requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract, or other instrument, the legal effect of which under
the facts and conclusions involved must be carefully determined.
72. "The 'practice of law' does not include the design, creation, publication, distribution, display,
or sale ...[of] computer software, or similar products if the products clearly and conspicuously state
that the products are not a substitute for the advice of an attorney." Id. at § 81.101(c); 1999 Tex. Gen.
Laws 3423 (amending § 81.101).
73. See Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir.
1990).
74. E.g., JOHN G. WELLS, EVERY MAN His OWN LAWYER AND BUSINESS FORM BOOK 3 (H.H.
Bancroft & Co. rev. ed. 1869).
75. E.g., William H. Brown, Legal Software and the UnauthorizedPracticeof Law: Protection or
Protectionism, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 157, 171 (1999) (suggesting auditing, testing, or licensing); Steve
French, Note, When Public Policies Collide... Legal "Self-Help" Software and the Unauthorized
Practiceof Law, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 93, 125-29 (2001) (proposing multiple solutions).
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trol. The measures ostensibly control quality through increased access and
integration of additional users and experts into increasingly sophisticated
systems of assessment. Knowing law becomes a matter of seemingly limitless communication in a system that perpetuates itself in the name of equating better knowledge with more information.
In the context of systems-thinking, law becomes a matter not of
memorizing precepts and rules, nor of observing how societies work, nor
even of acquiring the skills to engage in eloquent and felicitous legal
speech acts. It becomes an activity of information feedback and circulation.
XIII.USING CAMPUS SERVICES
The epitome of systems-thinking happens in the service economy. On
one campus, a quick search for services revealed offices explicitly designed
for alumni career services, assessment and analytical services, adult and
advisory services, billing and payment services, business services, central
computing services, data services, wireless services, communication and
network services, conference services, and so on down the alphabet
through health services and housing and dining services to visitor services
and workstation support services. (In addition, services such as "law enforcement services" and "shuttle services" appear in descriptions of units in
which "service" is not found in the units' titles.) Students, like legal practitioners and other twenty-first-century denizens, use both public and private
"services" to access information about themselves and the world, procure
forms and permissions, verify their status in institutions, pay their bills,
manage their health care, clean their houses, commute to work, and otherwise carry on the business of their lives. The growth of the welfare state
once made the "license" and entitlement to government largess into a "new
property."'76 The development of the neo-liberal state offers a diffusion of
services.
Such services are often characterized in part by service providers' invitations to users to partner as stakeholders in the service enterprise or system with either the government or private entities. As civic entities then,
service users represent a particular sort of legal subject. Service providers
generally structure the options from among which users may select. They
construe the user as neither active nor passive, neither autonomous moral
actor nor mere product of socialization. One might conceive of the "user"
as the offspring of rational choice and marketing theory. 77 She embodies
76. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733-38 (1964).
77. The remainder of this paragraph is from CONSTABLE, supranote 22, at 22-23.
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the joint hopes born from the shortcomings of both "rational actor" and
"consumer." While the "rational actor" assumed by economists and policymakers is too abstract and ethereal, too ungrounded in the things of the
world, to serve as a model citizen, the market "consumer" is too indiscriminating and materially-oriented to be taken seriously as an expert.
The "service user" is heir to both. The user combines the techniques of
cost-benefit analysis and concern for economic efficiency with utilitarian
calculations as to satisfactions-in new civic form. Unlike the rational
actor, the user manipulates things of this world. Unlike the consumer, the
user distinguishes needs from desires. The user provides input about the
satisfaction of her service needs and desires implicitly through patterns of
credit card transactions and other utility use. She does so explicitly through
the registration of warranties that guarantee (or limit) the servicing of products, through online surveys and telephone polls designed for feedback
about "how well we are doing," in membership and enrollment forms, and
through interactive and pop-up windows. Students entering a universitysponsored "gateway" to course websites, for instance, are presented with
short weekly surveys about when their professors actually hold exams or
how helpful students find library programs.
As modern campuses offer menus of services to their students, students become "users" who participate in the construction and elaboration of
those services. By graduation, students will have learned how to participate
in the civic world of services. They will be adept at providing feedback on
their satisfaction with the options offered by service enterprises. As local
residents, they may set up their own neighborhood watch or mediation
programs, informing and working with officials about their concerns. On
school boards and elsewhere they will offer, as both entitlement and duty,
their views about the available options.
XIV.UNIVERSITY AND COLLEGE PROFESSORS IN THE
EDUCATION BUSINESS

As to university professors, "at the present time," wrote Vico, "no person can master a single subject. ' 78 In contrast to Ancient Greece, when "a
single philosopher synthesized in himself a whole university, ' 79 the modem university in our time, as in Vico's, is necessary. Its advantage is that
students are taught by experts; its disadvantage, again as per Vico, is that

78. VICO, supra note 1, at 76.
79. Id. at 74.
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the disciplines to be learned no longer form a single system or coherent
80
unity.
One might argue that systematization of university education does occur today, although not at the level of the disciplines, which if anything
have become more specialized and distinct than in Vico's time. Systematization occurs-or is attempted-through administration. University administrators, for instance, have been known to distribute lists of action verbs to
accompany requests to departments to articulate unit-specific "learning
goals" and "curriculum maps" or narratives to show how such goals "intersect with" courses in the major.
In this context, the university or college professor is a different kind of
aid to education than she was in Vico's time. Formerly, her primary educational role was to teach in the area of scholarship in which she had expertise. Today she has become a local expert and an administrative assistant in
the education business. She spends as much or more time doing administrative work online than she does preparing for and teaching her classes: overseeing websites and uploading, downloading and emailing attachments,
syllabi, assignments, and reading materials. For her campus alone (setting
aside her "service" to professional associations and academic societies),
she fills out forms about resources and production, signs student petitions,
writes letters of recommendation, serves on policy and review committees,
submits grant applications, allocates fellowships, reports on budgets, revamps curricula, and completes online sexual harassment and professional
responsibility courses. In responding to solicitations from the administration for her opinions on subjects ranging from parking to recreational facilities to libraries to campus eating options to instructional technology, does
she become a potentially empowered member of an academic community,
or has she become a tool for the legitimation of campus policies that stem
from indeterminate origin? Her embeddedness, like that of her students, in
the system of regulations and services at her university appears to epitomize (in microcosm) the embeddedness of subjects in the systems of administrative law of twenty-first-century neo-liberal polities.
XV. CONCLUSION

I have now set forth the remarks suggested to me by a comparison of
common approaches to legal studies in our time with rhetorical approaches.
Not only have I compared other approaches to law-those of the professional law school, of philosophy, of economics, of sociology, of political
80. Id. at 76-77.
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science and anthropology, of poetry, of history-to those of rhetoric, but I
have indicated the rhetoricity of those approaches and of law. All these
approaches, like law itself, make claims. They presume addressees or audiences with particular capacities and attunements. They all do something
more than stating true/false propositions in speaking or writing as they do.
And all reveal something, for better and for worse, of our world and of the
law and legal subjects imagined in our time.
In sum, I have drawn out what can be done with legal rhetoric and I
have shown how little can be done by, or said about, law without it.

